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I. INTRODUCTION 
In his opening brief ("Opening Brief'), plaintiff articulated numerous facts that, together, 
demonstrate that there is a reasonable doubt that Micron Technology, Inc.'s ("Micron" or the 
"Company") Board of Directors (the "Board") would have been capable of impartially considering 
a demand to institute this litigation. Specifically, plaintiff listed a plethora of concrete facts and 
"red flags" that the Board, as stewards of Micron, either knew of or consciously ignored. Plaintiff 
also demonstrated, and defendants cannot demonstrate otherwise, that, despite the existence of 
these facts and red flags, defendants took no action to ensure that the Company wasn't violating 
the law until faced with an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ"). Even then, 
defendants only took the minitnum action necessary to receive amnesty from monetary liability in 
connection with the DOJ investigation. In the four years between the commencement of the DOJ 
investigation and the commencement of this shareholder derivative action, defendants have 
undeniably failed to seek any redress for the significant damage caused to the Company or to 
remove the key wrongdoers (defendants Michael W. Sadler ("Sadler") and Steven R. Appleton 
("Appleton")) from their positions with the Company. As a result of these and other breaches of 
fiduciary duty, there is a reasonable doubt as to the disinterestedness of a majority of the Board, 
excusing demand. 
In their brief ("Response Brief' or "Defs.' Brief'), defendants have argued that a finding of 
demand fi~tility is "rare" and have improperly parsed plaintiffs allegations, analyzing whether 
each allegation, standing alone, would be sufficient to establish demand futility. The proper 
analysis, however, is whether plaintiffs allegations, taken as a whole and in their totality, create a 
reasonable doubt as to the ability of the Board to impartially consider a demand. Defendants also 
mischaracterize and even ignore many of plaintiff's factual allegations. The facts present here 
demonstrate a Board that: (i) ignored fundamental problems with Micron's business, including the 
fact that its primary product was in trouble and that there were alarming trends concerning the 
supply and price of that product; (ii) ignored major news sources' discussions of price-fixing 
activities and the possible role of DRAM manufacturers, including Micron, in connection 
therewith; (iii) ignored meetings between senior executives at many of the major DRAM 
manufacturers, including Micron's Vice President of Worldwide Sales, concerning price-fixing; 
(iv) ignored the Company's CEO's knowledge of these meetings and participation in connection 
therewith; and (v) refused to take any action against either Micron's Vice President of Worldwide 
Sales or its CEO, both of whom knew about and participated in the conspiracy to fix the price of 
DRAM, or to seek any monetary recovery from the individual wrongdoers for the damages 
suffered by Micron. One former Board member has disclosed the likely reason why the Board 
ignored these facts and red flags and has steadfastly refused to take action: the Board was "very 
passive" and not "well-informed", and the damage caused to Micron could have been stopped if 
the Board would have been more "inquiring" and "aggressive" - includmg taking action against 
defendant Appleton. 
When these particularized facts are considered, a reasonable doubt that the Board could 
impartially consider a demand is apparent. Defendants have offered no compelling reason for 
why, after years of failing to act despite admitted wrongdoing and severe (and continuing) damage 
suffered by Micron, the Board should he expected to do anythjng other than reject any demand by 
plaintiff to bring suit. Accordingly, plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court reverse the 
district court's ruling and find that plaintiff has adequately pled demand futility. 
11. LEGAL STANDARDS 
Defendants spend nearly five pages of their brief arguing that the claims in derivative 
actions belong to the corporation and, therefore, that shareholders seeking to bring suit 
derivatively in the corporation's name face a "heavy burden." See Defs! Brief at 12-16. 
Although the law vests the power to manage the business and affairs of the corporation in the 
officers and directors, that power is not unfettered. A derivative action provides shareholders 
with an effective and speedy means of enforcing corporate governance standards when such 
enforcement would be otherwise elusive. As the United States Supreme Court wrote in Kamen: 
"[Tlhe purpose of the derivative action [is] to place in the hands of the individual shareholder a 
means to protect the interests of the corporation from the misfeasance and malfeasance of 
'faithless directors and managers.'" Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Znc., 500 U.S. 90, 95 (1991) 
(citation omitted). 
This remedy born of stockholder helplessness was long the chief regulator of 
corporate management and has afforded no small incentive to avoid at least 
grosser forms of betrayal of stockholders' interests. It is argued, and not without 
reason, that without it there would be little practical check on such abuses. 
Cohen v. Beneficial Zndus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). See also Surowitz v. Hilton 
Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363,371 (1966) ("derivative suits have played a rather important role in 
protecting shareholders of corporations from the designing schemes and wiles of insiders"). 
Indeed, notwithsfanding defendants' description of the purported "onerous" burden of pleading 
demand futility, the district court in the instant action thought it was a close call and went "back 
and forth" about whether to grant or deny the motion to dismiss. See May 10,2007 TR. p. 2, L. 
23 - p. 3, L. 1 ("I can tell you at this point, I've kind of looked at dismissing it, and I've looked at 
not dismissing it, and kind of gone back and forth on it. And, right now, I'm right down the 
middle."). 
Because of the important role shareholder derivative actions play in protecting corporate 
interests in the face of mismanagement by its fiduciaries, Delaware law' provides that a 
shareholder may institute and maintain a derivative suit without first making a demand on a 
board of directors where the shareholder pleads facts sufficient to create a "reasonable doubt" 
that, as of the time the complaint is filed, the board of directors could have properly exercised its 
independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a demand. Rales v. Blasband, 
634 A.2d 927,934 @el. 1993). A reasonable doubt is not a difficult burden for plaintiff to meet. 
A reasonable doubt is defined as "a doubt based upon reason and common sense ... [which] 
intelligent, reasonable and impartial people may honestly entertain . . .." Mills v. State, 732 A.2d 
845, 851 @el. 1999). If the derivative plaintiff creates a reasonable doubt as to the 
disinterestedness or independence of the board, then demand will be excused as futile. Rales, 
634 A.2d at 934. 
In making any determination as to demand futility under Delaware law, all reasonable 
inferences must be drawn in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. In re Cendant Corp. 
Derivative Action Litig., 189 F.R.D. 117, 127 @.N.J. 1999). A plaintiff is not required to plead 
' The parties agree that Delaware law applies to this Court's demand futility analysis because 
Micron is a Delaware corporation. See Defs.' Brief at 12; Kamen, 500 U.S. at 108-09. 
evidence, nor is proof of success on the merits required. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 
2000). The court should look only at the pleadings, and all inferences must be viewed in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party. Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104 
(2002); Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990). "[Elvery reasonable 
intendment will be made to sustain a complaint against a motion to dismiss ...." Idaho Comm'n 
on Human Rights v. Campbell, 95 Idaho 21 5,2 17 (1973). 
III. PLAINTIFF HAS ADEQUATELY ALLEGED THAT DEMAND ON MICRON'S 
BOARD WAS FUTILE 
In attacking the sufficiency of plaintiffs demand futility allegations, defendants attempt to 
parse the allegations and attack each allegation separately, rather than examining the totality of 
the allegations. This is not the proper analysis. Although plaintiff has made various particular 
allegations pertaining to demand futility, dismissal does not hinge on any particular allegation. 
Courts addressing this issue have held that the court should engage in a single demand fiitility 
analysis for the entire action, taking account of the totality of a plaintiffs allegations. See, e.g., 
In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 1 1  1, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (in denying a motion to 
dismiss for demand futility, the court considered the totality of the circumstances); In re Gen. 
Instrument Corp. See. Litig., 23 F. Supp. 2d 867,875 (N.D. 111. 1998) (citing In re Storage Tech. 
Corp. See. Litig., 804 F. Supp. 1368, 1375-76 @. Colo. 1992)) (same); Bergstein v. Tex. Intl 
Co., 453 A.2d 467, 469 @el. Ch. 1982) (same); Edgeworth v. First Nut? Bank, 677 F. Supp. 
982,993 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (in denying a motion for summary judgment, the court considered the 
totality of the circumstances) (same). Accordmgly, as this Court analyzes whether plaintiff has 
pled facts suELicient to raise the requisite reasonable doubt as to demand futility, it should 
examine the totalig of plaintiffs allegations, not, as defendants do, whether each allegation 
standing alone would be sufficient. 
A. A Majority of the Board Consciously Disregarded Red Flags and Permitted 
Micron to Particiaate in the DRAM Price-Fixing Consairacv, Rendering . - - " .  - 
Demand Futile 
Defendants do not dispute that demand is futile where a plaintiff alleges facts 
demonstrating that the directors were actually aware of known violations, yet took no steps to 
prevent or remedy the situation. See In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 
795,806 (7th Cir. 2003); Defs.' Brief at 17. In acknowledging this one method of demonstrating 
the futility of demand, defendants repeatedly insist that plaintiff "must" allege facts 
demonstrating that the directors were "actually aware of known violations" in order to create a 
reasonable doubt as to the directors' disinterestedness. See, e.g., Defs.' Brief at 17,21. However, 
conscious inaction in the face of red flags is also a breach of the duty of good faith and, 
therefore, falls outside the protection of the business judgment rule, rendering demand futile. See 
R. Vol. 11, p. 410; Abboft, 325 F.3d at 809; In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 
@el. 2006) (it is a failure to act in good faith when a director consciously disregards a known 
duty); Stone ex. rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 @el. 2006) (under 
Delaware law, a failure to act in good faith may be shown where the fiduciary intentionally fails 
to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties) 
(citing Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 67). As demonstrated in plaintiff's Opening Brief and herein, 
the totality of plaintiff's factual allegations create a reasonable doubt as to the disinterestedness 
of a majority of the Board based on their failure to act in the face of red flags. 
First, plaintiff has alleged, and defendants do not dispute, that sales of DRAM 
represented 95% of Micron's revenues; that DRAM sales had a huge impact on the Company's 
success; and that the spot price of DRAM virtually mirrored the price of Micron common stock. 
R. Vol. 11, p. 289, 71 1, p. 322, 7107(a). Thus, the significance of DRAM to Micron, taken in 
conjunction with plaintiffs other allegations (detailed below), triggered a fiduciary duty to 
investigate potential wrongdoing and take action as necessary to halt any actual wrongdoing and 
protect Micron from fkther harm. See, e.g., R. Vol. 11, pp. 302-05, 7747-61, p. 322, 7107(a). 
See also In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Derivative Litig., 554 F .  Supp. 2d 1044, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 
2008) (finding demand futile where directors failed to take corrective action despite existence of 
two "red flags" where wrongdoing involved the "core" of the company's business model).' 
Plaintiff m h e r  argues that "in cases in which a company's primary product or service is in 
jeopardy, courts have been willing to impute that knowledge to the company's officers and 
directors." In re Biopure Corp. Derivative Litig., 424 F .  Supp. 2d 305, 308 @. Mass. 2006). 
Defendants attempt to avoid Biopure by arguing that it is inconsistent with Delaware law and has 
Defendants misunderstand plaintiffs allegations in this regard, insisting that the price-fixing 
conspiracy was not a "major development [ ] in the strategy, pricing and sales of DRAM chips," 
but rather "isolated activity engaged in by some employees." Defs.' Brief at 20. Plaintiff has not 
alleged that price-fixing was part of some official Company strategy blessed by the directors, but 
rather that the significance of DRAM to Micron required the directors to be aware of major 
developments in DRAM strategy, pricing and sales and, thus, investigate and take action in light 
of the plethora of red flags being waved in their collective faces. As noted in the Opening Brief, 
defendants themselves acknowledge that the directors "would be aware of the relationship 
between DRAM pricing, and the price of Micron common stock." Opening Brief at 12 (quoting 
May 10,2007 TR. p. 34, L. 3-4). 
not been adopted by the Delaware courts. Defs.' Brief at 1 8 . ~  Defendants, however, do not 
provide any Delaware case explicitly rejecting the holding in ~ i o ~ u r e . ~  Ironically, defendants 
hinge their argument on the holding in another non-Delaware case: In re Forest Labs., Inc. 
Derivative Litig., 450 F.  Supp. 2d 379,390 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Defs.' Brief at 18-19. Forest Labs 
is distinguishable. The court in Forest Labs refused to attribute knowledge of the true facts 
concerning the company's key products to the outside directors because there were no allegations 
that the facts at issue concerning those products had or would have "catastrophic consequences 
for Forest's primary sources of revenue or put the 'company's primary product ... in jeopardy."' 
Id. at 393 (quoting Biopure, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 308). Defendants argue that, like in Forest Labs, 
plaintiff here has failed to allege that the Company's key product was "in jeopardy" or faced 
"catashophic consequences." Defs.' Brief at 19. This is wrong. Plaintiff has alleged that: (i) the 
major DRAM manufacturers understood that, absent a concerted effort to the contrary, RDRAM 
Defendants ignore the other case law cited in Plaintiffs Opening Brief, apparently because 
those cases are not derivative cases. See Defs.' Brief at 18. These cases, however, are relevant, 
as they impute knowledge to a corporation's officers and directors even under the heightened 
pleading standards applicable to securities fraud class actions. See in  re Kccuron Pharms., Inc. 
Sec. Litig., No. 04-2627,2005 WL 2989674, at *7 @.D. Pa  July 1,2005) (the importance to the 
company of the lead drug under development warranted an inference of recklessness, at the least, 
of its officers and directors); In re Ramp Neiworlrs, Inc. Sec., 201 F. Supp. 2d 105 1, 1076 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002) ("generally, where major transactions or core information is at issue, an inference 
arises that top officers of a company were aware of the transaction or information") (citations 
omitted). 
4 Defendants contend that imputing knowledge to Micron's directors somehow undermines 
Plaintiffs position that there were sufficient red flags to trigger a duty to investigate and take 
action which may have revealed evidence of price-fixing. Defs.' Brief at 17. It does not. The 
significance of DRAM to Micron's success demonstrates that knowledge of DRAM pricing 
issues should be imputed to the Directors, which, taken together with Plaintiffs other allegations, 
triggered a duty to act. 
(built by Micron's competitors) would become the leading DRAM technology (R. Vol. 11, p. 288, 
77, pp. 302-03,7747-52); (ii) the price-fixing conspiracy was undertaken in order to combat the 
growing popularity of RDRAM, the royalties Rambus demanded for the use of RDRAM 
technology and the dramatically declining prices generally in the DRAM market (R. Vol. 11, p. 
289,710, p. 305,7759-61); and (iii) the downward spiral of DRAM prices was so serious that by 
2001, various news sources were reporting that the major DRAM manufacturers had been 
holding meetings regarding how to deal with it (R. Vol. 11, p. 289,712, pp. 307-09, 7767-72). 
These facts demonstrate that Micron's primary product, DRAM, was "in jeopardy." 
Second, plaintiff alleges that by 2000, various news sources, including CNN and 
periodicals relevant to the DRAM industry, had begun to discuss the possibility of price-fixing 
among the leading DRAM manufacturers. R. Vol. 11, p. 306, 762, p. 307,767, p. 308, 769, p. 
309, 772. As plaintiff noted in his Opening Brief, defendants themselves admit that newspaper 
articles can serve as red flags sufficient to put directors on notice of potential wrongdoing. See 
May 10, 2007 TR. p. 83, L. 11-13. ("Of course [newspaper articles] can mean something. 
We're not saying that newspaper articles can Y be redflags."). These red flags triggered a duty 
to investigate the participation of Micron and its representatives in the DRAM price-fixing 
conspiracy by at least 2000, but the defendants nonetheless took no action. R. Vol. 11, p. 31 1, 
7786-87. Defendants contend that these articles were not "red flags" because they did not 
specifically mention Micron in connection with the DRAM price-fixing conspiracy. Defs! Brief 
at 21-24. The articles referenced the "major DRAM manufacturers," of which Micron 
unquestionably was one, and suggested the existence of potential price-fixing. R. Vol. 11, p. 306, 
762, p. 307,767, p. 308, 769, p. 309, 772. Whether or not the articles proved that Micron was 
involved in the conspiracy is irrelevant-it created a duty on the part of defendants to investigate 
whether Micron was, in fact, involved and, if so, to take action to stop the illegal activity. 
Defendants failed to act in the face of these red flags. 
Defendants rely upon two cases in support of their position that the content of the articles 
was insufficient to trigger a duty to act: Ash v. McCall, No. 17132, 2000 WL 1370341, at *4, 
*15-*16 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15,2000), and Spear v. Conway, No. 401919103,2003 WL 240121 18, at 
*2, *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 17, 2003). Defs.' Brief at 24. Both of these cases are easily 
distinguishable. Fist, as  discussed in detail in the Opening Brief, the plaintiffs in Ash alleged 
only four minor "red flags" and only alleged that the defendants failed to detect the wrongdoing 
for a mere three and a half months. In contrast, plaintiff here has alleged a much stronger case of 
red flags, especially in light of the fact that the declining price of DRAM was jeopardizing 
Micron's future business prospects at the same time as the red flags were appearing. Moreover, 
the red flags in the instant action were being waved in the collective faces of the members of 
Micron's Board for a much longer period of time than in Ash. See R. Vol. 11, p. 306,762, p. 307, 
767, p. 308, 769. The court in Ash even noted that demand may have been excused if the 
plaintiffs had alleged that the board had "knowledge of facts indicating" the wrongdoing and 
took no action until it was confronted with the wrongdoing diiectly. Ash, 2000 WL 1370341, at 
*16. Here, plaintiff has alleged red flags demonstrating that the members of the Board had 
"knowledge of facts indicating" potential price-fixing at Micron and took no action to respond 
until (and, in fact, even after) the DOJ issued a subpoena related thereto. 
Spear is similarly distinguishable. In Spear, the alleged wrongdoing related only to 
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc.'s ("Memll Lynch") internet research analysts, and the "red flags" at 
issue related thereto, not to any product or service remotely approaching 95% of Menill Lynch's 
business. Spear, 2003 WL 240121 18, at *2. Accordingly, the court found that the complaint at 
issue "contain[ed] no allegations . . . leading to an inference that the director defendants knew of 
said misconduct and made a conscious decision not to act in response thereto," and that the 
supposed "red flags" identified were not sufficient "to impute or suggest the director defendants' 
knowledge of the . . . wrongdoing." Id. at *6. Here, as discussed above, it is reasonable to infer 
that the directors were aware of the red flags, especially in light of the significance of DRAM to 
Micron's business. Such facts were not present in Spear.? 
Third, plaintiff alleges that between September 2001 and March 2002 (during and after the 
meetings between defendant Sadler and the CEOs of the other major DRAM manufacturers), 
Defendants also argue that the red flags were insufficient to trigger a duty to investigate 
because Plaintiff purportedly has not alleged that the directors read the articles or cited to 
documents evidencing that the directors had actual knowledge of the red flags. Defs.' Brief at 
24. ~l&tiff has alleged that the articles at issue were published in major sources such as CNN 
and industry magazines that Board members would have reviewed - especially when the 
publications are discussing possible price-fixing in connection with Micron's primary product 
that was in jeopardy. R. Vol. 11, p. 306,762, p. 307,767, p. 308,769, p. 309,772. While the 
contents of specific conversations demonstrating defendants' knowledge of the price-fixing 
conspiracy could add support to plaintiffs allegations, such allegations are not necessary in order 
for this Court to find that the facts alleged (which, along with all reasonable inferences 
therefrom, must be taken as true in the context of this motion to dismiss) are sufficient to create a 
reasonable doubt as to the disinterestedness of members of the Board. Plaintiff need not prove 
his allegations at this stage of the case. See Rales, 634 A.2d at 934 (plaintiff is not required to 
plead evidence, nor is proof of success on the merits required). 
Micron cut its supply of DRAM by 20% and DRAM prices shot up to $4.50 each in the first 
quarter of 2002. R. Vol. 11, p. 310,7181-82. In light of the significance of DRAM to Micron's 
success and the other red flags detailed above, a 20% cut in DRAM supply and coinciding 
increase in DRAM prices of more than 100% could not have gone unnoticed by a conscientious 
Board. Defendants nonetheless contend that these allegations simply reflect the "basic economic 
principle" of supply and demand which "would be no reason for any Board member to think [it 
was] ... the result of an illegal price-fixing conspiracy." Defs! Brief at 21, n.6. Standing alone, 
that may be true. But this drastic decrease in DRAM supply and increase in price, in light of the 
other red flags detailed above and the importance of DRAM to Micron's success, provided the 
grounds for suspicion needed to trigger a duty to investigate potential price manipulation. 
Defendants nonetheless failed to act in breach of their fiduciary duties. 
Final&, plaintiff has alleged that throughout October 2001, as prices of DRAM dipped 
below $1 for 128 Mb of DRAM, defendant Sadler, who had the ultimate pricing authority for 
DRAM pricing for all Micron customers (Affidavit of Marc M. Umeda in Support of Request for 
Judicial Notice in Support of Appellant's Brief "Umeda Aff"), Ex. A at p. 1063"), met with the 
CEOs of other DRAM manufacturers to determine whether some of the other DRAM 
manufacturers would be cutting DRAM production. R Vol. 11, p. 295, 725, p. 307, 165. 
Defendant Appleton discussed pricing with defendant Sadler once a week, knew that Sadler was 
in contact with the other DRAM manufacturers, authorized Sadler's trips to engage in such 
discussions, received interim reports from Sadler while S a d h  was out of the country meeting 
with Micron's competitors about DRAM prices, and even planned to fly to Munich himself to 
meet secretly with Infineon and the Samsung Electronics ("Samsung") CEO about cutting back 
DRAM production. Umeda Aff., Ex. B. pp. 1203-06, 1256,1264; R. Vol. 11, p. 307,766. Further, 
defendant Sadler testified to the United States government that his "comments to Mr. Appleton 
should have allowed him to draw the conclusion that [Sadler] had price information from 
competitors." Id. at p. 1205 L. 21-23.6 Defendant Appleton thus participated in and/or had 
knowledge of the conspiracy to fix DRAM prices, and faces a suffciently substantial likelihood of 
liability therefor, rendering demand on him futile.' 
Plaintiff also alleges that defendant Appleton shared information regarding the 
developments in DRAM pricing and strategy with fellow directors James W. Bagley, Robert A. 
Lothrop, Gordon C. Smith ("Smith") and William P. Weber at various meetings of the Board and 
its committees. R Vol. 11, pp. 293-97, fl23-31, p. 323, f/107(b). The case law supports such an 
inference. See, e.g., Abbott, 325 F.3d at 806 ("Under proper corporate governance procedures . .. 
information of the violations would have been shared at the board meetings."). If the information 
was shared with the members of the Board and the directors took no action, as plaintiff alleges, 
Defendants completely ignore plaintiffs references to defendant Sadler's testimony because 
such allegations "are not included in the Third Amended Complaint." Defs! Brief at 25. In the 
context of a motion to dismiss, however, the Court may rely on the pleadings and any documents 
subject to judicial notice. See Doe v. H m ,  No. 0205441D, 2003 WL 21015134, at *1 (Idaho 
Feb. 5, 2003). This Court granted plaintiffs request for judicial notice of defendant Sadler's 
testimony and, therefore, such testimony is properly considered in determining whether Plaintiff 
adequately alleged demand futility. See Order Granting Request for Judicial Notice, dated 
October 31,2008, and attached hereto. 
The district court agreed with this position, as it found demand on Appleton futile. See R Vol. 
11, p. 408. 
then a majority of the Board faces a sufficiently substantial threat of liability and demand is thus 
excused. 
Despite this case law, defendants argue that plaintiff has not sufficiently pled facts 
showing that defendant Appleton shared relevant DRAM information with the other directors at 
Board meetings. Defs.' Brief at 25-26. If defendants' position is correct, and defendant Appleton 
did not share information with the rest of the Board concerning the DRAM price-fixing activities 
of which he was aware (nor can such a fact be inferred), then defendant Appleton hid these facts 
from his fellow Board members and has caused substantial harm to the Company. Yet, to this 
day, the Board has never taken action against defendant Appleton (or defendant Sadler, for that 
matter). As discussed in the following section, this failure by the Board to seek to remove 
defendant Appleton from his positions with Micron or seek the damages he has caused to Micron 
demonstrates the futility of making a demand on the Board. Therefore, if, as defendants contend, 
defendant Appleton did not share such information with his fellow directors, then he blatantly 
breached his fiduciary duties to the Company, and the Board's utter failure to take any action 
against defendant Appleton shows that any demand by plaintiff to do the same would also be 
futile. Accordingly, whether Appleton shared the adverse information with his fellow Board 
members or not, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the Board is capable of impartially 
considering a demand. 
B. The Board Failed to Take Action Against or Seek Any Monetary Recovery 
from the Wrongdoers Despite the Massive Damages Suffered by Micron 
Even After the Company Admitted Involvement in the Price-Fixing 
Conspiracy, Further Rendering Demand Futile 
It is a breach of the duty of good faith, and therefore demand is futile, when a director 
consciously fails to act in the face of a known duty to act. See, e.g., Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 27 
(it is a failure to act in good faith when a director consciously disregards a known duty); Stone, 
91 1 A.2d at 369 (under Delaware law, a "failure to act in good faith may be shown . . . where the 
fiduciary ... intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a 
conscious disregard for his duties") (emphasis added) (citing Walt Disney, 906 A.2d at 67). 
Here, it has been admitted that the Company's CEOIChairmdresident and its Vice President of 
Worldwide Sales knew about and actively participated in a conspiracy to fix the prices of the 
Company's primary product, and the conspiracy has caused substantial harm to the Company. In 
this situation, the members of the Board have a fiduciary duty to take action that is in the best 
interests of the Company. As discussed in the Opening Brief and below, defendants have failed 
to do so. 
As the district court acknowledged, defendants were on notice of the involvement of 
Micron employees in the price-fixing conspiracy by at least June 2002, when the DOJ issued a 
federal grand jury subpoena to Micron that demanded any documents relating to contacts and 
communications between DRAM manufacturers regarding any discussions relating to pricing 
and sales of DRAM chips. R. Vol. 11, pp. 223-24, p. 289, 713, pp. 309-10, 776. Nonetheless, 
defendants stood by idly while Micron representatives, led by defendant Appleton, denied their 
involvement in the DRAM price-fixing scheme for over two years. R. Vol. 11, p. 290,715, pp. 
314-15, 7794-95. Despite defendant Appleton's knowledge of the price-fixing conspiracy, his 
failure to inform the rest of the Board about the illegal activity (as defendants have argued) and 
the corresponding harm suffered by Micron as a result thereof, the Board has not taken any 
action seeking redress from defendant Appleton or defendant Sadler or asked them to step down, 
and both defendants remain employed by the Company. Defendant Smith, one of Micron's long- 
standing Board members, eventually shed some light on the Board's curious refusal to take any 
action against defendant Appleton: the directors tacked independence from  le let on.' 
Defendant Smith stated that a change at the top should have been made a long time ago, but that 
the rest of the Board was not prepared to make the necessary change. R. Vol. 11, pp. 319-20, 
lj101, pp. 324-25, $107(d). Defendant Smith further stated that Micron needed new management 
and perhaps a completely new Board. Defendant Smith also said that the Board as a whole was 
"very passive" and not "well-informed and that the damage caused to Micron due to faulty 
management could have been stopped if the Board would have been more "aggressive" and 
"inquiring." 1d9 
Defendants contend that the Board acted properly based on: cooperation with the DOJ 
investigation in exchange for amnesty from monetary penalties from the DOJ; the fact that such 
* Shortly after defendant Smith spoke out against defendant Appleton, he left the Company. 
Defendants attempt to m i n i i e  defendant Smith's statements by arguing that defendant Smith 
"said nothing at all about the Board's awareness of or response to the price-fixing activities." 
Defs.' Brief at 30, n.8. This argument misses the point. Defendant Smith's attacks on the Board 
confirm plaintifl's allegations that the Board was inadequate throughout the Relevant Period in 
their actions and inaction, and that they refused to take any action that would expose Appleton or 
themselves to liability. The fact that defendant Smith did not specifically discuss price-fixing in 
the interview is irrelevant. 
treatment from the DOJ required action to terminate Micron's participation in the activity; and 
Micron's representation that it was taking steps to prevent the same misconduct. Defs.' Brief at 
28. Defendants apparently believe that their fiduciary duties stop there notwithstanding the 
magnitude of the wrongdoing and the harm the Company continues to suffer. Defendants have 
never provided Plaintiff, the district court or this Court with evidence of any further steps taken 
by the Board to pursue the key wrongdoers (i.e., defendants Sadler and Appleton) or to seek to 
recover from any of the individual wrongdoers the money Micron has been forced to pay as a 
result of their wrongful acts. Defendants instead hide behind a shroud of secrecy, arguing that 
because plaintiff does not have access to Micron's internal documents, this Court is to presume 
that the Board has acted properly. See Defs.' Brief at 29-30.'' The facts, however, tell a 
different story. Defendants Appleton and Sadler remain with the Company - a fact defendants 
ignore altogether in their Response Brief. The Company has not received any monetary 
reimbursement from defendants Appleton and Sadler despite the fact that the Company has been 
forced to bear all of the costs associated with litigation stemming from the involvement of its 
representatives in the conspiracy to fix DRAM prices, including: (i) money expended 
investigating, defending and settling the numerous public and private actions brought against it; 
lo The discovery process may reveal what, if anything, defendants actually did to seek redress 
from the admitted wrongdoers that have caused so much damage to the Company. Defendants 
are attempting to assert the business judgment rule as an affirmative defense here, which is 
properly considered in a motion for summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss. See Ticor Title 
Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 122 (2007) (motion treated as one for summary judgment where 
matters outside of the pleadings are considered). A motion to dismiss is l i t e d  to the pleadings 
and any judicially noticeable facts, and defendants' vague references to what may or may not 
have been done in secret are irrelevant in the context of this appeal. 
(ii) the $91 million the Company agreed to pay on January 9,2007 in connection with the Direct 
Purchaser Settlement; and (iii) significant potential liability stemming fiom the final resolution 
of violations of antitrust laws. R. Vol. 11, pp. 292-93, 720, p. 300, 740. This inaction by the 
Board in the face of admitted and egregious wrongdoing and the massive damages that have 
been and continue to be suffered by the Company supports a reasonable inference that any 
demand by plaintiff on this Board would be futile." 
C. The Board Consciously Failed to Monitor or Oversee Micron's Operations, 
Further Rendering Demand Futile 
Directors also face a sufficiently substantial threat of liability, and demand is thus futile, 
where defendants "consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations, thus disabling 
themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention." Stone, 91 1 A.2d 
at 370. For the same reasons discussed in Section I1I.A. above, defendants consciously failed to 
monitor or oversee Micron's operations, which permitted the Company, through its 
representatives, to participate in vast conspiracy to fix the price of DRAM. 
As discussed in the Opening Brief, the Delaware Chancery Court recognized in Conrad v. 
Blank, 940 A.2d 28, 38 @el. Ch. 2007), that "it would be odd if Delaware law required a 
stockholder to make demand on the board of directors" where various theories exist on which to 
recover from the corporation's officers and directors, there is substantial evidence of wrongdoing 
and the company ended its "investigation" without explanation and apparently without seeking 
redress of any kind. Defendants argue that a finding of demand futility on these grounds would 
be tantamount to the theory, "if they were inclined to sue, they would have done so before now," 
which defendants contend has been rejected by Delaware courts. Defs! Brief at 30-3 1. Plaintiff 
is not arguing that every time a board of directors decides not to take action, demand is futile. 
However, where, as here, there is admitted and serious wrongdoing, massive and ongoing harm 
to the corporation, viable theories of recovery, and no efforts by the Board to seek redress of any 
kind, there is indeed a reason to doubt whether the Board is capable of impartially considering a 
demand. 
In his Opening Brief, plaintiff pointed the Court to Ash to illustrate this issue. As 
defendants acknowledge, the court in Ash explicitly stated that if the plaintiffs were able to allege 
with some particularity that the directors "had actual knowledge" of the wrongdoing, or 
"knowledge of facts indicating" the wrongdoing, and took no action until it was confronted with 
the wrongdoing directly, such facts could excuse demand. Ash, 2000 W1, 1370341, at *16; 
Defs.' Brief at 33. As discussed above, plaintiff has alleged red flags demonstrating that the 
members of the Board had "knowledge of facts indicating" potential price-fixing at Micron and 
took no action to respond before it entered into an agreement with the DOJ (and effectively took 
no action even thereafter)." Accordingly, demand is also futile based on the conscious failure to 
oversee. 
IV. DEEXNDANTS HAVE NOT PROPERLY RAISED THE ISSUE OF WHETHER 
PLAINTIFF COMPLIED WITH IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23(f); 
IN ANY EVENT, PLAINTIFF HAS COMPLIED WITH R m E  2 3 0  
In the motion to dismiss briefmg in the district court, defendants argued that this action 
should be dismissed because plaintiff purportedly did not comply with IRCP 2 3 0 ,  ("Rule 
230") which requires a plaintiff to allege that he "was a shareholder or member at the lime of 
the transaction of which the plaintiff complains." R. Vol. 11, p. 422, Ex. 1 1 at 24-25. The district 
court rejected this argument, stating that "the way they've alleged [stock ownership] complies 
l2 Defendants argue that the red flags in the instant action "pale in comparison to those rejected 
by the Ash court." Defs.' Brief at 32-33. This is simply inaccurate. As discussed in Section 
1II.A. the red flags in this case are more substantial and were ignored for a longer period of time 
than those at issue in Ash. 
with Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." Jan. 16, 2008 TR. P. 33, L. 22-24. Defendants now 
attempt to present this as an additional issue on appeal. Defs.' Brief at 34-36. 
While a respondent may list additional issues presented on appeal in his brief, if the 
respondent seeks affirmative relief by way of reversal, vacation or modification of a judgment, 
order, or decree, then a cross-appeal is required rather than presenting the issue as an additional 
issue on appeal. See I.A.R. 15(a); I.A.R. 1 l(g); State v. Fisher, 140 Idaho 365 (2004). Here, 
because defendants seek to reverse the district court's finding that plaintiff had adequately pled 
stock ownership for purposes Rule 23(f), they must raise the issue by cross-appeal, and the issue 
is not properly raised on appeal at this point. 
In any event, if this Court does consider the issue of whether plaintiff has sufficiently 
pled his ownership of Micron stock, plaintiff has done so. As noted above, Rule 2 3 0  requires 
plaintiff to allege that he "was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which 
the plaintiff complains ...." Plaintiff here complains of no discrete "transaction," but instead 
complains of continuing breaches of duties. Thus, plaintiff's assertion that he "is and was an 
owner of the stock of Micron during times relevant to the Individual Defendants' wrongful 
course of conduct alleged herein, and remains a shareholder of the Company" satisfies Idaho's 
requirement. R. Vol. 11, p. 321,7106. 
Defendants interpret Rule 2 3 0  to require a11 plaintiffs to provide the exact dates which 
they became shareholders. Defs.' Brief at 34-35. This position is not supported by the statute or 
any law applying to the statute. To support their argument, defendants rely primarily on two 
irrelevant federal cases: In re Sagent Tech., Znc. Derivative Litig., 278 F .  Supp. 2d 1079, 1096 
(N.D. Cal. 2003) and In re OmniVision Techs. Inc. Derivative Litig., No. 2297, 2004 WL 
2397586, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2004).13 Defs! Brief at 34. The court in Sagent relied on the 
9th Circuit's interpretation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23.1 requiring that "the 
derivative plaintiff 'be a shareholder at the time of the alleged wrongful acts' and 'retain 
ownership of the stock for the duration of the lawsuit."' Sagent, 278 F. Supp. 2d at 1096 
(quoting Lewis v. Chiles, 719 F.2d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 1983)). Even under this interpretation of 
federal law, plaintiff has suMiciently alleged that he "is and was an owner of the stock of Micron 
during times relevant to the Individual Defendants' wrongful course of conduct alleged herein, 
and remains a shareholder of the Company." R. Vol. 11, p. 321, 7106. There is no requirement 
that plaintiff allege the exact date he purchased Micron stock in order to maintain standing in a 
derivative action, and such a requirement is not necessary to serve the policy interests behind 
"contemporaneous ownership." See Brambles USA, Inc. v. Blocker, 731 F. Supp. 643, 648-49 
(D. Del. 1990) (primary purpose of contemporaneous ownership requirement for shareholder 
derivative suit is to curtail strike suits by prohibiting potential plaintiffs from buying into lawsuit 
through purchase of stock in corporation after alleged wrong has occurred); In re Penn Cent. 
Tramp. Co., 341 F. Supp. 845, 846 (E.D. P a  1972) (contemporaneous ownership rule is 
designed to prevent the "buying" of a lawsuit by persons who purchase stock with intention of 
bringing a derivative action and winning damages for the corporation which will increase the 
l3 In re OmniVision, which also relies on federal interpretation of Federal Rules of Civil. 
Procedure, Rule. 23.1 is simply inapposite, as, on the face of the complaints in that action, the 
plaintiffs did not own stock at the beginning of the relevant period. In re OmniVision, 2004 WL 
2397586, at *2-*3. 
value of the stock). Defendants' speculative suggestions that this is a strike suit and that plaintiff 
may have bought this lawsuit are baseless and should be ignored by the Court. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons discussed in the Opening Brief, plaintiff 
respectfully requests that the Court reverse the district court's order and find that plaintiff has 
adequately alleged that demand in this case was excused.14 
l4 Should the Court be incliied to a f h  the district court's ruling, plaintiff respectfully requests 
that the Court remand this case to the district court in order to allow plaintiff to send a litigation 
demand to the Micron Board without the risk of potential statute of limitations issues. Indeed, 
defendants previously sought to dismiss factually related claims in a securities class action based 
on the statute of limitations. R. Vol. I, pp. 184-94. Plaintiff requests a remand, in the alternative, 
in order to ensure that Micron's best interests can still be protected in the event the dismissal of 
this case is affirmed. 
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) '  Nominal Defendant-Respondent. 1 
I 
A REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF and I 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARC Ivf. UMEDA IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR JUDIClAL NOTICE 
IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF with attachments was filed by counsel for Appellant 
- 
Scott Orrock on October 3,2008. The Court is fuily advised; therefore, good cause appearing, 
Ij 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE be, I 
and hereby is, GRANTED and this Court shall take judicial notice of the documents listed 
below, copies of which are attached as Exhibits A and  t to the affidavit of Marc M. Umeda in 
I support, and placed with the EXHIBITS for the convenience of the Court: 1 .  United States v. Swamoa, No. CR 06-0692 PJH, Transcript of Jury Trial Proceedings, 
I . I   
Volume 5 (N.D. CaI. Feb. 1 I, 2008); and 
I 
2. United States v, Swamon, No. CR 06-0692 PJH, Transcript of Jury Trial Proceedings, 
Volume 6 (N.D. Cd. Feb. 12,2008). 
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